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ABSTRACT
We analyze a general equilibrium exchange economy with a continuum of agents who have
"catching up with the Joneses" preferences and differ only with respect to the curvature of their utility
functions. While individual risk aversion does not change over time, dynamic redistribution of wealth
among the agents leads to countercyclical time variation in the Sharpe ratio of stock returns. We show
that both the conditional risk premium and the return volatility are negatively related to the level of stock
prices, as observed empirically. Therefore, our model exhibits many of the empirically observed
properties of aggregate stock returns, e.g., patterns of autocorrelation in returns,the "leverage effect" in
return volatility and long-horizon return predictability. For comparison,otherwise similar representative
agent economies with the same type of preferences exhibit counter-factual behavior, e.g., a constant
Sharpe ratio of returns and procyclical risk premium and return volatility.
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Many classical dynamic models such as Lucas (1978) and Cox, Ingersoll and Ross (1985)
use the representative investor framework to study determination of asset prices. This ap-
proach renders the computation of equilibrium elegantly simple and contributes much to our
understanding of how underlying economic structures such as preferences, endowments and
production technologies, inﬂuence asset prices. As shown in a recent paper by Campbell
and Cochrane (1999), many of the empirically observed features of stock prices can be re-
produced within a model with a single representative agent whose utility function exhibits
countercyclical variation in risk aversion, giving rise to a slowly varying, countercyclical risk
premium in stock returns. In this paper we explore a speciﬁc economic mechanism leading
to countercyclical variation in the conditional risk premium. We study an economy popu-
lated by heterogeneous agents whose individual risk aversion is constant over time but varies
across the population. The aggregate risk premium in such economy exhibits countercyclical
variation due to endogenous changes in the cross-sectional distribution of wealth. Relatively
risk tolerant agents hold higher proportion of their wealth in stocks. Therefore, a decline
in the stock market reduces the fraction of aggregate wealth controlled by such agents and
hence their contribution to the aggregate risk aversion. Thus, the equilibrium risk premium
rises as a result of a fall in stock prices.
We calibrate our model to match the basic unconditional moments of stock and bond re-
turns and compare its conditional properties to historical evidence. We ﬁnd that endogenous
changes in conditional moments of returns due to preference heterogeneity are of suﬃciently
large magnitude to be economically signiﬁcant. However, changes in expected stock returns
in the model are still partly driven by the time varying interest rates, a result of the func-
tional form of individual preferences assumed in our analysis. Thus, while heterogeneous
risk preferences can give rise to many of the observed properties of asset returns, the simple
structure of our model does not capture all of the important quantitative features of the
data.
A representative-agent model can be viewed as a reduced form description of an out-
come of the aggregation procedure in an economy populated by heterogeneous agents. Such
models are silent about the precise nature of individual investor behavior and hence say
nothing about disaggregated variables, such as individual asset holdings and consumption.
Our model accounts for investor heterogeneity explicitly. Thus, in addition to relating aggre-
gate consumption to asset prices, it generates implications for individual investor behavior,
which can be used to evaluate the empirical plausibility of heterogeneous risk preferences as
an explanation of the salient features of the aggregate stock market behavior. In particular,
1we ﬁnd that individual asset holdings in our model economy are comparable across the pop-
ulation, even though a signiﬁcant degree of preference heterogeneity is necessary to capture
the unconditional properties of asset returns. On the other hand, perfect risk sharing in our
model implies sizable cross-sectional diﬀerences in individual consumption volatility. This
oﬀers a natural target for future extensions of our basic model which is distinct from simply
improving its asset pricing implications.
In two related papers, Dumas (1989) and Wang (1996) consider economies in which
agents diﬀer in their risk aversion.1 Dumas analyzes a two-person production economy with
an exogenous stock return process and relies purely on numerical analysis. Wang considers a
two-person exchange economy and is able to obtain closed-form expressions for certain bond
prices under several speciﬁc combinations of individual risk aversion coeﬃcients. Our work
diﬀers from theirs in three important aspects. First, while Dumas and Wang emphasize
the dynamics and the term structure of interest rates, our main focus is on the behavior
of stock prices. Second, they consider time-separable, state-independent utility functions,
while preferences in our model exhibit the “catching up with the Joneses” feature. As a
result, the asymptotic cross-sectional distribution of wealth is not degenerate in our model,
i.e., no single type dominates the economy as aggregate wealth increases without bound,
unlike in the exchange economy in Wang (1996).2 This result is important since it allows us
to discuss the average, long-run properties of asset prices. Finally, unlike their papers, we
calibrate our model and assess its quantitative implications relative to historical data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3
characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 4 examines the dynamics of stock returns.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a continuous time, inﬁnite horizon exchange economy with complete ﬁnancial
markets and a single perishable consumption good. There is only one source of uncertainty
and investors trade in ﬁnancial securities to share risk.
Our model has two somewhat non-standard elements. First, we assume that agents’ pref-
erences exhibit the “catching up with the Joneses” feature of Abel (1990, 1999). Speciﬁcally,
1Other forms of heterogeneity have also been considered in the literature. For instance, Mankiw (1986)
and Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996) argue that diﬀerences in investors’ non-insurable income process can
help explain the equity premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985). See Brav, Constantinides and Geczy
(1999) for some related empirical evidence. In the context of portfolio insurance, Grossman and Zhou (1996)
study a ﬁnite-horizon exchange economy with two types of agents.
2Dumas (1989) demonstrates that the cross-sectional wealth distribution in his model can be stationary
under certain assumptions on model parameters. In our model the wealth distribution is always stationary.
2we assume that individual utility is a power function of the ratio of individual consumption
to the social standard of living. This form of preferences retains the property of the standard
CRRA utility function that individual risk aversion does not change over time. Second, we
assume that there exists a continuum of investors who diﬀer from each other with respect to
the curvature of their utility functions.
The “catching up with the Joneses” feature of preferences guarantees the existence of a
non-degenerate stationary cross-sectional distribution of wealth. It also allows the equilib-
rium interest rate to be relatively low even though the aggregate utility curvature is relatively
high.3 Time variation in the Sharpe ratio of stock returns comes entirely from preference
heterogeneity. Moreover, heterogeneity can give rise to countercyclical variation in return
volatility, while we show that in otherwise similar homogeneous economies volatility is pro-
cyclical.4
Aggregate Endowment
The aggregate endowment process Yt is described by a geometric Brownian motion
dYt = µYt dt + σYt dBt,t ∈ [0,∞)( 1 )
where Bt is a standard Brownian motion. Both µ and σ are constants with µ>σ 2/2
and σ>0. Well known properties of this process include its conditional log-normality and
non-negativity.
Capital Markets
There are two long-lived ﬁnancial securities available for trading: a risky asset, the stock,a n d
a locally riskless instrument. The stock price is denoted by Pt; the instantaneous risk-free
interest rate is denoted by rt. There is a single share of the stock outstanding, which entitles
its holder to the dividend stream Yt. The bond is available in zero net supply.
Preferences and Cross-Sectional Heterogeneity








3In a representative agent model with standard time-separable CRRA utility function, it is diﬃcult to
reconcile high values of the Sharpe ratio with low level of the risk-free rate. This “risk-free rate puzzle” is
discussed in Weil (1989).
4The procyclical behavior of volatility in this context means that a high level of the price-dividend ratio
or a large increase in stock prices is associated with higher levels of volatility. Alternatively, changes in










Ct is the consumption rate at time t. Xt is a state variable treated as exogenous by individ-
ual investors, which will be given an interpretation of the standard of living in the economy.
The time-discount rate ρ is common to all investors. The only agent-speciﬁc feature of pref-
erences is the curvature parameter γ, which measures individual risk aversion with respect
to consumption gambles. γ can be equivalently interpreted as the individual risk aversion
coeﬃcient with respect to wealth gambles, just as with standard CRRA utility function.
Because the utility function is homothetic in consumption and individuals treat the process
Xt as exogenous, the indirect utility function over wealth is also homothetic, of the form
1/(1−γ)W
1−γ
t h(Xt,·), where the multiplier h(Xt,·) depends also on the current investment
opportunity set. The only distinction from the standard CRRA case is the dependence of
h on Xt. Thus, the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient with respect to wealth gambles is also
equal to γ and does not change over time. While such a dual interpretation of γ is possible
at an individual level, it does not hold in the aggregate, since the utility function of the
representative agent is derived from individual preferences and is not homothetic in general
(unless all agents in the economy have identical preferences). Thus, the “ratio” functional
form of preferences in (2) is particularly convenient for isolating the eﬀects of preference
heterogeneity. Any kind of time-variation in the aggregate risk aversion must be due to the
diﬀerences in γ across investors.
The speciﬁcation in (2) implies that the utility of the investor is inﬂuenced not only
directly by her own consumption, but also by the standard of living of others. Abel (1990,
1999) refers to preferences of this type as “catching up with the Joneses” – a higher standard
of living Xt provides a complementary eﬀect on current consumption.5 Formally, comple-
mentarity of the standard of living and individual consumption requires that
∂UC (Ct,X t;γ)
∂Xt




t ≥ 0. (3)
Thus, we restrict our analysis to γ ≥ 1. We allow for a continuum or a ﬁnite collection of
preference types, deﬁned over γ ∈ [1,∞).
5This type of preferences is often referred to as “external habit formation”. Various speciﬁcations of
representative agent models with habit formation have been analyzed in the literature. Major contributions in
continuous time setting include Ryder and Heal (1973), Sundaresan (1989), Constantinides (1990), Detemple
and Zapatero (1991), Hindy and Huang (1992, 1993), Hindy, Huang and Zhu (1997). Abel (1990, 1999),
Gali (1994), and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) consider discrete-time models. Bakshi and Chen (1996)
develop a related model in which agents derive utility directly from their social status, measured by their
wealth relative to the social wealth index. On the empirical side, Campbell and Cochrane (1999), Ferson
and Constantinides (1991), and Heaton (1995) confront such models with historical data and ﬁnd that they
overcome many of the shortcomings of standard models with time-separable, state-independent preferences.
4Our speciﬁcation of preferences diﬀers from Abel’s in the deﬁnition of the process Xt.W e








where xt =l n( Xt)a n dyt ≡ ln(Yt). Abel allows Xt to depend on the agent’s own consump-
tion as well. More importantly, he restricts the history dependence in Xt to a single lag in
a discrete-time model. Our use of an inﬁnite moving average in (4) reduces variability of
the expected growth rate of the marginal utility of consumption, lowering the volatility and
increasing the persistence of the interest rate in equilibrium.
Deﬁnition (4) justiﬁes the interpretation of Xt as the standard of living. One can see that
the parameter λ governs the degree of history-dependence in Xt.W h e nλ   σ2, xt ≈ yt, i.e.,
the standard of living tracks closely the most recent realizations of the aggregate endowment.
On the other hand, if λ ≈ 0, then Xt is inﬂuenced heavily by the past history.
It is convenient to describe the state of the economy in terms of the variable ωt ≡ yt−xt.
Since ωt measures aggregate consumption relative to the standard of living, ωt =l n( Yt/Xt),
we call it relative (log) consumption. Naturally, a high (low) relative consumption value is
interpreted as a good (bad) state of the economy. Given the lognormal speciﬁcation of the
aggregate endowment process, relative consumption is conditionally normally distributed
and follows a linear mean-reverting process
dωt = −λ(ωt − ω) dt + σdB t, (5)


















The behavior of relative consumption reﬂects the slow-moving nature of the standard of
living process. Aggregate endowment shocks get incorporated into the relative consump-
tion variable instantaneously and then decay exponentially at rate λ, as the standard of
6 In equilibrium of our exchange economy model there is no distinction between the aggregate endowment
and the aggregate consumption, as a result of market clearing in the goods markets. Hence, one can
equivalently think of Xt as a weighted average of past realizations of the aggregate consumption. In other
contexts, however, the two deﬁnitions are not equivalent. It may be convenient to deﬁne the standard of
living in terms of income of other agents in the economy, as opposed to their consumption, as such deﬁnition
circumvents the externality problems that otherwise drive a wedge between the competitive equilibrium and
the solution of the central planner’s problem. However, formal analysis of these two alternative modeling
approaches is beyond the scope of this paper.
5living process slowly adapts to the new level of endowment. Higher values of λ imply lower
persistence and lower steady-state variance of relative consumption.
3 The Competitive Equilibrium
In this section we analyze the general properties of the competitive equilibrium in the
heterogeneous-agent economy. We solve the model in three steps, as is standard in the
literature (e.g., Karatzas et al. (1990), Wang (1996)). First, we analyze the social planner’s
problem in order to obtain the optimal consumption sharing rule. Then, we construct an
Arrow-Debreu economy to support the optimal allocation found in the planner’s problem.
Finally, we implement the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium as a sequential-trade economy.
The Social Planner’s Problem
The social planner distributes the aggregate endowment among the consumers so that the
resulting allocation is Pareto optimal. We assume without loss of generality that there is
only one investor of each type and f (γ) is the social weight attached by the planner to type




























, ∀t ∈ [0,∞). (6)
Since there is no intertemporal transfer of resources, this optimization reduces to a static













subject to the resource constraint (6). The following lemma summarizes the optimal sharing
rule.













7For technical reasons, it is convenient to assume that the distribution f (γ) has a compact support.







γ z(ωt)−ωtdγ =1 . (9)
Lemma 1 shows that individual consumption, as a fraction of the aggregate endowment, is
a function of relative consumption ωt, which is a stationary state variable. Thus, consumption
(and hence wealth) of all investors grows at the same average rate and no single agent
dominates the economy in the long run. In contrast, a heterogeneous economy in which
agents have standard time-separable CRRA preferences with the same time discount rate
is eventually dominated by the least risk averse agent, as shown in Wang (1996). This
diﬀerence between the two models is due to the “catching up with the Joneses” feature of
preferences. In Wang’s exchange economy, at high levels of consumption, the marginal utility
of investors with low values of γ is relatively high. Thus, they are allocated a larger fraction
of the aggregate endowment. This is not the case in our economy, because high levels of
consumption are associated with high levels of the social standard of living Xt, which has
a larger impact on the marginal utility of investors with high values of γ. Therefore, the
“catching up with the Joneses” feature has an equalizing eﬀect on marginal utilities of agents
with diﬀerent curvature parameters. As a result, the shares of the aggregate endowment
allocated to individual agents remain stationary over time and depend on the ratio of the
aggregate endowment to the standard of living.
The Arrow-Debreu Economy
It is well known that the Pareto optimal allocation (7–9) can be supported as an equilibrium
allocation in a particular Arrow-Debreu economy (e.g., Duﬃe and Huang (1985)). In this
economy, agents can trade in primitive state-contingent claims, which pay oﬀ a unit of
consumption in a particular state of the economy and zero otherwise. Let ξt,s denote the
stochastic discount factor in such economy, then the price of an arbitrary payoﬀ stream





. ξt,s can be expressed in terms of the
shadow price of the resource constraint in the social planner’s problem,
ξt,s =e x p( −ρ(s − t) − zt + zs + xt − xs),t ≤ s. (10)
The Sequential-Trade Economy
Given the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium, a sequential-trade equilibrium can be constructed, in
which investors trade continuously in a small number of long-lived securities. Duﬃe and
Huang (1985) provide general analysis of such an implementation problem. Their results
7can be extended to our setting using arguments similar to those in Wang (1996, Lemma 3).8
Prices of long-lived assets in equilibrium are determined by the prices of primitive Arrow-













while the instantaneous interest rate is given by
rt = lim
∆t 0












In this section we analyze the dynamics of asset prices. We point out qualitative and
quantitative diﬀerences in the behavior of stock returns in heterogeneous and homogeneous
economies and argue that these diﬀerences can be understood in terms of the evolution of
the cross-sectional distribution of wealth over time.
4.1 Theoretical Characterization
While the general expression for the stock price is provided by (11), a more explicit char-
acterization would facilitate further qualitative analysis. The following lemma provides a
characterization of the stock price.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium price-dividend ratio is given by
Pt
Yt











The expression (13) shows that the price-dividend ratio Pt/Yt depends only on relative
consumption ωt. The price-dividend ratio summarizes the conditional expectations of future
discount rates and dividend growth rates. Under our speciﬁcation of the aggregate endow-
ment process, future dividend growth is independent of the current state of the economy.
8 To use the results in Duﬃe and Huang (1985), one needs to establish that the ﬁnancial markets are
dynamically complete. In our economy there is only one source of uncertainty, hence to ensure dynamic
completeness the volatility of stock returns must be positive almost surely. For economies populated with
identical agents with γ ≥ 1 this follows from the fact that the price-dividend ratio is nondecreasing in
relative consumption, which implies that σR,t ≥ σ (see the Appendix). A general result for heterogeneous
economies is diﬃcult to establish, although our numerical simulations conﬁrm that the volatility of returns is
strictly positive. However, dynamic completeness is easy to guarantee by introducing continuously re-settled
ﬁnancial contracts with unit volatility and endogenously determined rate of return. See Karatzas et al.
(1990) for a formal construction.
8Thus, the price-dividend ratio depends only on the distribution of future discount rates. The
higher the future discount rates, the lower the price-dividend ratio.
To relate (13) to standard results, consider as an example a representative agent econ-
omy with logarithmic preferences. When there is only one type with γ = 1, (9) becomes














which is the well-known solution.
In our complete-market economy, the stochastic discount factor ξt,s in (10) is uniquely
determined in equilibrium and can be used to analyze the conditional moments of asset
returns (see, e.g., Duﬃe (1996, Section 6.D)). The key property of our model is the coun-
tercyclical behavior of the Sharpe ratio of stock returns in equilibrium. This property is
important, since it leads to empirically plausible patterns of predictability in stock returns,
as documented below. Preference heterogeneity provides an intuitive economic mechanism
for generating such countercyclical behavior of the Sharpe ratio.9
Lemma 3 If the economy is populated by more than a single type of agents, the instanta-
neous Sharpe ratio of stock returns is a monotonically decreasing function of relative con-




  (ωt), (14)
where z (ωt) is the logarithm of the shadow price of the resource constraint characterized by
(9) and µR,t and σR,t denote the instantaneous mean and volatility of stock returns.
The result of Lemma 3 can be seen as an outcome of the endogenous re-distribution
of wealth in the economy. Agents with relatively low risk aversion coeﬃcients hold higher
proportion of their wealth in stocks. Therefore, a decline in the stock market reduces the
fraction of aggregate wealth controlled by such agents. To induce the agents to hold the
entire stock market in the aggregate, the equilibrium compensation for risk (the Sharpe
ratio) must rise.
The following lemma provides expressions for the risk-free rate and the mean and volatil-
ity of stock returns.
9The Sharpe ratio of stock returns in our model is proportional to the curvature of the utility function of
the representative agent. In the context of a one-period Arrow-Debreu economy populated by CRRA-utility
agents who diﬀer in their risk aversion, Benninga and Mayshar (1997) show that such curvature is decreasing
in the level of the aggregate endowment. Lemma 3 is mathematically equivalent to their result.
9Lemma 4 The instantaneous interest rate rt is given by
rt = ρ + λ(ωt − ω)z





   (ωt). (15)








µR,t = rt − σz
 (ωt)σR,t. (17)
4.2 Simulation Results
In this section we quantify the eﬀects of preference heterogeneity. We calibrate our model
using several unconditional moments of historical asset returns and then investigate the dy-
namics of conditional moments. We also highlight the impact of heterogeneity by comparing
heterogeneous and homogeneous economies.
Calibration
In choosing model parameters we use historical returns of S&P 500 index, commercial paper
returns, and per capita consumption over the 1889–1994 period. All returns and consumption
data are real. We focus on the century-long sample, as opposed to the post-war sample. We
do this for two reasons. First, the post-war sample presents a much tougher target for
calibration, because of the relatively low volatility of consumption and the risk-free rate
and the relatively high Sharpe ratio of stock returns. As a result, our choice of individual
preferences and the cross-sectional distribution of agent types assumed below do not allow us
to match the unconditional moments of the data with high accuracy. This makes it diﬃcult
to interpret the implications of the model for the conditional properties of returns. Second,
historical periods like Great Depression cannot be ruled out ex ante, therefore omitting them
from the sample might misrepresent the average properties of asset returns. Thus, we opt
for using the century-long sample in our calibration, acknowledging that the basic form of
our model has diﬃculty in matching the moments of the post-war sample period.
We choose the mean and standard deviation of the endowment process, µ and σ,t om a t c h
the corresponding values of per capita aggregate consumption. As in the data, we average
the consumption level over every year. We assume that the cross-sectional distribution of
weights in the objective of the social planner is described by





We choose parameters a1 and a2 together with the time discount rate ρ and the persistence
10parameter λ to match closely the ﬁrst two moments of excess returns on stocks and the
risk-free rate. Table 1 summarizes our parameter choices. A summary of the implied un-
conditional moments of the model is presented in Table 2.10 By construction, the model
reproduces the ﬁrst two moments of stock and bond returns. It also gives rise to a highly
persistent risk-free rate. This is due to the fact that the state variable, relative consump-
tion, is slow-moving. This is an improvement over the one-lag discrete time model of Abel
(1990), in which the risk-free rate is highly volatile and has low persistence. The average
price-dividend ratio in the model is comparable to that in historical data, but the long-run
standard deviation of the ratio is higher than empirically observed.
For comparison, we also calibrate a model with a single type of agents. The homogeneous
model is not capable of simultaneously reproducing the same four unconditional moments of
returns. Therefore, we set the parameters with an objective of minimizing the volatility of
the risk-free rate, while matching closely the remaining three of the four moments. Parame-
ter values and the key properties of the homogeneous model are summarized in Tables 1, 2.
Overall, the performance of the homogeneous model is comparable to that of the heteroge-
neous model in terms of replicating the unconditional moments of stock and bond returns,
except that the interest rate volatility is relatively high.
Conditional Moments of Returns
The key to understanding the properties of stock returns in the model is through the relations
between conditional moments of returns and relative consumption. Figure 2 shows that the
price-dividend ratio is a monotonically increasing function of relative consumption. This
is intuitive given the countercyclical behavior of expected stock returns, as shown below.
Thus, conditional moments of returns can be equivalently stated in terms of the level of
stock prices.
The main eﬀect of preference heterogeneity can be seen in the behavior of the Sharpe
ratio of returns. As we have established in Lemma 3, the Sharpe ratio in a heterogeneous
economy is countercyclical, while it is constant in economies populated by a single type
of agents.11 The negative relation between the Sharpe ratio and relative consumption is
10 The real risk-free rate is not directly observable and only ex-post real returns can be constructed from
the data. The standard deviation of ex-post returns on commercial paper overstates the actual volatility
of the risk free rate due to unanticipated inﬂation. For the same reason, realized real returns on bonds are
less persistent than the expected real rate of return. Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, p.329) argue that
historical volatility of the ex-ante real rate of return on short-term bonds is close to 3%, which is consistent
with the results in Siegel (1992). This is the number we use in our calibration. We estimate the historical
autocorrelation coeﬃcient based on both nominal returns on commercial paper and the ex-post real returns.
Ex-post returns are less persistent than nominal returns.
11Ferson and Harvey (1991) and Harvey (1991) provide empirical evidence on countercyclical variation in
11shown in Panel A of Figure 3. The Sharpe ratio varies signiﬁcantly over time. The long-run
standard deviation of the Sharpe ratio in the heterogeneous model is 0.06 and its long-run
mean is 0.32. As we have argued above, the countercyclical behavior of the Sharpe ratio
is driven by the endogenous re-distribution of wealth in the economy. Figure 4 illustrates
the cross-sectional distribution of wealth implied by our choice of model parameters and the
utility weights in (18). We plot the wealth distribution for three diﬀerent values of relative
consumption: ω − σ[ω], ω,a n dω + σ[ω], representing a below-average, the average, and an
above-average states of the economy. In each case the distribution has a similar shape. A
decline in relative consumption shifts the mass of the wealth distribution towards the types
with higher risk aversion, increasing the Sharpe ratio.
Panel B of Figure 3 presents the conditional volatility of returns as a function of relative
consumption. Again, the eﬀect of preference heterogeneity is clear. While the conditional
volatility in any homogeneous economy is procyclical (this general result is established in
the Appendix), a heterogeneous economy can exhibit a countercyclical pattern in volatility.
This eﬀect requires a suﬃcient degree of preference heterogeneity and depends on the shape
of the cross-sectional wealth distribution.12 Intuition for why preference heterogeneity can
change the pattern of conditional volatility is suggested by the following observation. While
the conditional volatility increases with relative consumption in homogeneous economies, it
also appears to rise with the risk aversion parameter across the homogeneous economies. We
illustrate this in Figure 5 by plotting the conditional volatility of returns in homogeneous
economies with diﬀerent values of the risk aversion parameter, holding other parameters
ﬁxed at their calibrated values shown in Table 1. A fall in relative consumption leads to
two eﬀects. If the aggregate risk aversion remained constant, the direct eﬀect would be a
decline in conditional volatility. However, since the wealth distribution shifts towards more
risk averse agents, the indirect eﬀect is an increase in conditional volatility. The second
eﬀect dominates when the degree of cross-sectional heterogeneity is suﬃciently high. Thus,
the countercyclical variation in conditional volatility in the heterogeneous economy can be
informally attributed to an eﬀective shift across homogeneous economies with diﬀerent levels
of aggregate risk aversion.
the market price of risk and expected returns. These moments are negatively related to the price-dividend
ratio and are higher during business cycle troughs than during peaks.
12 If one assumes that most of the agents in the economy have risk aversion coeﬃcients close to one, it
is possible to show using asymptotic analysis that the countercyclical pattern in conditional volatility arises
if the cross-sectional dispersion of risk aversion coeﬃcients is suﬃciently high relative to the “average” risk
aversion. See Chan and Kogan (2000) for formal derivations.
12Predictability of Stock Returns
To analyze the patterns of predictability in stock returns, we simulate 50,000 years of returns
and compute the population values of several commonly used statistics. In our analysis we
focus on excess stock returns to isolate the eﬀect of the time-varying expected return from
the impact of the time-varying interest rate. We compare the properties of the model with
the corresponding empirical estimates. To emphasize the eﬀect of preference heterogeneity,
we also present the statistics for the homogeneous model calibrated to the same set of
unconditional moments of returns as the heterogeneous model.
The ﬁrst two panels of Table 3 show that excess stock returns in the heterogeneous
model exhibit univariate mean reversion. In the second panel, individual autocorrelations
are aggregated into partial sums to cope with the fact that individual coeﬃcients are poorly
measured. The resulting coeﬃcients are negative in sign, as in historical data. This negative
autocorrelation in the model is due to the countercyclical behavior of the Sharpe ratio and
conditional volatility of excess returns, which implies that a decline in stock prices leads
to an increase in expected excess returns. In contrast, the homogeneous model produces
slightly positive autocorrelation coeﬃcients. This is because the Sharpe ratio of stock returns
is constant in the homogeneous model and conditional volatility is procyclical, therefore
expected excess returns are procyclical as well.
The price-dividend ratio forecasts excess stock returns with a negative sign in the het-
erogeneous model, as shown in the third panel of Table 3 and in Table 4. While the sign of
this relation is consistent with empirical observations, the explanatory power of the price-
dividend ratio in long-horizon predictive regressions is smaller than in the data. However, if
we were to estimate the same relations for stock returns, as opposed to returns in excess of
the risk-free rate, the slopes and the R2s would increase approximately by a factor of 4 and
10 respectively, matching closely the corresponding empirical numbers. This suggests that
the reason for the relatively small magnitude of the eﬀects in Table 4 is that stock returns are
partly predictable due to the changes in the risk-free rate. One can further see this through
a decomposition of the instantaneous expected stock return as a sum of the risk-free rate and
the risk premium (expected excess return). Figure 6 shows that the countercyclical nature of
expected returns in our heterogeneous model is partly due to the varying risk premium and
partly to the varying interest rate. This is an advance over the homogeneous model, in which
the conditional risk premium is procyclical and therefore the negative relation between the
price-dividend ratio and returns is driven entirely by the dynamics of interest rates. Thus, it
is preference heterogeneity that generates negative variation in the risk premium. However,
a signiﬁcant fraction of stock return predictability in the heterogeneous model is still due to
13time variation in the risk-free rate, which is a feature of our preference speciﬁcation (2). In
particular, the long-run standard deviation of the risk-free rate is 2.9%, compared to 1.7%
for the risk premium. This explains the magnitude of the R2s in the predictive regressions in
Table 4. Subtracting the risk-free rate from stock returns signiﬁcantly reduces the variance
of the remaining predictable component of returns.
The last panel of Table 3 shows that the price-dividend ratio forecasts volatility of returns
for many years ahead. In particular, a decline in stock prices predicts an increase in volatility.
This is intuitive in light of the behavior of the instantaneous conditional volatility of returns
(see Figure 3, Panel B). This pattern of cross-correlations between the price-dividend ratio
and the absolute value of returns is similar to the one observed empirically and is consistent
with the well-known “leverage eﬀect” (e.g., Black (1976), Schwert (1989), Campbell and
Hentschel (1992)). For comparison, the homogeneous model generates a counter-factual
positive relation between the level of prices and future volatility of returns, demonstrating
that the negative relation must be due to preference heterogeneity.
Wealth Distribution and Individual Policies
In addition to evaluating the implications of our model for asset prices, one can judge the
plausibility of its economic mechanism based on the properties of individual investor behavior
required to produce sizable variation in conditional moments of stock returns. In particu-
lar, since time-variation in the aggregate risk premium in our model is driven entirely by
heterogeneity in individual risk exposure and resulting changes in the cross-sectional wealth
distribution, we quantify the cross-sectional distribution of asset holdings within the model.
To further assess the eﬀect of risk sharing among heterogeneous agents, we also document
the properties of individual consumption processes.
Individual portfolios policies can be conveniently summarized by individual exposure to
the aggregate market risk. As one would expect, less risk averse agents invest a higher fraction
of their wealth in risky assets. We document the cross-sectional dispersion in individual risk
exposure in Figure 7. Speciﬁcally, we compute the instantaneous betas of individual wealth
processes with respect to the aggregate stock market and plot the cross-sectional distribution
of such betas. While Figure 4 shows that individual risk aversion coeﬃcients vary widely
across the population, according to Figure 7 most of the time more than ninety percent of
total wealth is controlled by individuals with risk exposure between .88 and 1.2. Thus, the
magnitude of the cross-sectional dispersion in individual risk exposure within the model does
not seem excessive and leverage ratios for most individuals are relatively low. The intuition
behind this ﬁnding can be understood by considering the equilibrium consumption policies
of individuals with high values of γ. In the limit of risk aversion approaching inﬁnity, Lemma
141 shows that the consumption policy of such agents is proportional to the standard of living
process, scaled appropriately to satisfy the individual budget constraint. Due to the catching
up with the Joneses feature of preferences, high-γ agents are reluctant to substitute their
relative consumption over time, therefore their consumption tracks closely the economy-wide
standard of living. Thus, the wealth process of a high-γ agent is approximately proportional
to the present discounted value of a ﬁnancial asset with cash ﬂows equal to the standard
of living Xt. The process Xt is in turn a moving average of the aggregate endowment and
has similar long-run behavior. Hence, the wealth process of high-γ individuals is close to
the (scaled) value of the claim on aggregate endowment and its market beta is close to one.
According to Figure 4, a signiﬁcant fraction of the total wealth in the economy is controlled
by agents with relatively high risk aversion, explaining the concentration of individual risk
exposure around one in Figure 4.
The above argument also explains why the consumption of high-γ agents has relatively
low instantaneous volatility. This is because it closely tracks the process for the standard of
living Xt, which is locally deterministic. Market clearing implies that the agents with low
values of the curvature parameter must absorb a larger portion of the aggregate endowment
volatility. To quantify the implications of risk sharing in our model economy for individual
consumption processes, we plot the cross-sectional distribution of instantaneous consump-
tion volatility in Figure 8. Approximately seventy ﬁve percent of the aggregate wealth is
controlled by agents with consumption volatility below the volatility of the aggregate en-
dowment. However, ten percent of the aggregate wealth belongs to agents with consumption
volatility at least two and a half times higher than that of the aggregate. Although empiri-
cally the time-series properties of individual consumption are diﬃcult to measure precisely,
the fact that our model implies a substantial degree of dispersion in volatility of individual
consumption across the population could be viewed as one of its limitations. The basic model
of this paper could be extended in a number of directions with the objective of improving
its cross-sectional implications. Heterogeneity in individual risk exposure could arise not
only due to diﬀerences in risk aversion, but also from diﬀerences in beliefs, access to capi-
tal markets, idiosyncratic uninsurable risk, etc.13 Incorporating these additional dimensions
of heterogeneity could help produce realistic cross-sectional features of individual policies.
Generalizing the framework of this paper while retaining its tractability poses a challenge
for future research.
13Several papers make progress along these dimensions, e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994), Constantinides
and Duﬃe (1996), Basak and Cuoco (1998), Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1999), Storesletten et al. (2001).
155C o n c l u s i o n
Representative agent models identify economic mechanisms that generate empirically ob-
served features of asset prices. One such mechanism is countercyclical variation in the
aggregate risk aversion and the market price of risk, as shown by Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). This eﬀect arises in our model as a result of heterogeneity in risk preferences among
the agents. In a heterogeneous economy, moves in the stock market trigger changes in the
cross-sectional distribution of wealth, which we show to cause countercyclical variation in
the conditional risk premium and volatility of stock returns.
While endogenous changes in aggregate risk aversion contribute with the right sign to the
pattern of time variation in expected returns and volatility, a nontrivial fraction of expected
return variation in our model is still due to changes in the risk-free rate. This property of
the model is explained by our choice of the speciﬁc functional form of preferences. Thus, we
cannot argue that the observed empirical properties of stock returns should be attributed
to heterogeneous risk preferences alone. Nevertheless, the ability of our heterogeneous-agent
model to replicate various qualitative features of aggregate stock returns is encouraging. It
suggests that many salient features of the data can arise naturally as a result of interaction
of rational investors with diﬀerent risk preferences.
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The sharing rule in (7) and (8) is simply the ﬁrst order condition for consumption in the social
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γztdγ = eωt, (19)
where zt ≡ lnZt. The resource constraint (19) establishes a mapping between zt and ωt.T h e
inverse of this mapping, z (ωt), deﬁnes the logarithm of the shadow price, zt, as a function of
relative consumption ωt. Thus, consumption policy is a function of ωt, c∗
t (Yt,Xt;γ)=c∗
t (ωt;γ).
Proof of Lemma 2
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The price-dividend ratio is well deﬁned. Since f (γ) has compact support, the function z (ω)i s
asymptotically linear as |ω|→∞and therefore the expectation of exp(z (ωt)) is ﬁnite.
Proof of Lemma 3
In equilibrium, the instantaneous Sharpe ratio is equal to the absolute value of the volatility of
the stochastic discount factor (e.g., Duﬃe (1996, Section 6.D)), |σz| = −σz  (ωt). To show that
the aggregate curvature parameter is negatively related to relative consumption it is suﬃcient to
































and the previous equality implies z   (ωt) > 0.
Properties of the Model with Homogeneous Preferences
We establish some general properties of the stock price and return volatility in homogeneous
economies. Abel (1999) derives explicit expressions for conditional moments of returns in a discrete-
time economy under the assumption that the standard of living depends on a single lag of the
aggregate consumption process. The conditional moments of returns in his model are constant. As
we demonstrate below, this is not the case in a model with a slow-varying standard of living.
The next lemma shows that the price-dividend ratio in homogeneous economies is a monotone,
convex function of relative consumption.
Lemma 5 In a homogeneous economy with catching up with the Joneses preferences, the price-
dividend ratio is:




> 0,γ > 1,
=0 ,γ =1 .
( b )I ti sac o n v e xf u n c t i o no fωt for γ>1.
Proof. (a) With homogeneous agents, from the deﬁnition of z (ωt) we immediately have

































Diﬀerentiating with respect to ω and rearranging terms, we obtain
dP
dω










It is obvious that P>P1. Thus, we have established part (a).
(b) Diﬀerentiating (20) again with respect to ω gives
d2P
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2 P2,
where




Again, it is obvious that P>P1 > P2. Using (20) and rearranging terms,
d2P









=( γ − 1)
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P + P2 − 2P1

.
Thus, to complete the proof, it remains to show that P + P2 − 2P1 > 0. But,

















Since all the terms involved are positive, we have P + P2 − 2P 1 > 0. This completes the proof.
We can gain more intuition behind Lemma 5 by examining the marginal utility process. Formally,










dt − γσdBt. (21)
Thus, a change in the state variable aﬀects future marginal utility except when γ =1 .F o rγ>1,
an increase in ω raises the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (the ratio of future to current
marginal utility). In other words, the stock becomes more expensive relative to the current dividend,
as the state prices for future dividend claims increase. This explains the positive relation between
the price-dividend ratio and the state variable.
Lemma 6 In the homogeneous economy with catching up with the Joneses preferences,
(a) the Sharpe ratio is constant and given by γσ.
(b) The instantaneous interest rate is given by




19Lemma 6 follows from the standard consumption CAPM. The lemma shows that the price of
risk πt is constant. The instantaneous interest rate inherits the stochastic behavior of the state
variable. Moreover, its variation is increasing in both λ and risk aversion.
As (21) indicates, the growth rate of the marginal utility is state-dependent for γ  =1 . T h i s
implies that volatility also depends on the state of the economy. The next lemma formally shows
that the conditional volatility of stock returns is also a monotone function of the state.
Lemma 7 In an economy with homogeneous preferences, the following properties hold:





> 0, for γ  =1 ,
=0 , for γ =1 .
(b) The instantaneous correlation between changes in volatility and returns is positive for γ  =1
and equal to zero for γ =1 .























where the second equality follows from part (b) of Lemma 5. Showing the expression in brackets






















where κt ≡ κte(1−γ)e−λtω. (22) follows from Schwartz’s inequality.


















A sw eh a v es h o w ni nL e m m a5 ,s g n ( dσR/dω) ≥ 0. In addition, according to (20),
d(P/Y)/dω
(P/Y)

















This establishes the result of part (b).
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24Parameter Variable Model
Heterogeneous Homogeneous
Mean consumption growth (%) µ 1.80 1.80
Standard deviation of consumption growth (%) σ 4.02 4.02
Degree of history-dependence in Xt (%) λ 5.87 4.00
Subjective discount factor (%) ρ 5.21 5.30
Risk aversion coeﬃcient γ —8 . 1 4
Cross-section of utility weights a1 3.53 —
a2 .030 —




∗ 1.72 1.72 1.72
σ [∆c]
∗ 3.28 3.28 3.28
E[rB]
∗ 1.83 1.83 1.83
σ [rB]
∗ 3.0 2.90 4.02
ρ1 [rB] .85 .96 .97
E[rS − rB]
∗ 4.18 4.18 4.18
σ [rS − rB]
∗ 17.74 17.79 17.70
E[rS − rB]/σ[rS − rB]
∗ .24 .24 .24
exp(E[p − y]) 22.48 28.76 27.21
σ [p − y] .28 .51 .49
ω —. 3 2 . 4 7
σ [ω]— . 1 2 . 1 4
Table 2: Moments of simulated and historical data. The historical moments are based on
the 1889–1994 sample period (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997, Table 8.1) report the
ﬁrst two moments of stock and bond returns). All returns are deﬁned at annual frequency.
Consumption is averaged over every year and the price-dividend ratio is deﬁned at the end of
the year. “∗” denotes the moments that model parameters were chosen to match. Whenever
possible, moments of the model are computed by integrating with respect to the long-run
stationary distribution of the model. In remaining cases moments are estimated based on
50,000 years of simulated data. All returns are annual percentages. ∆c is log consumption
growth; rB ≡
 1




R,tdt is log stock return; p−y is log
price-dividend ratio. ρ1[rB] denotes the ﬁrst-order autocorrelation coeﬃcient of the interest
rate process. The “Data” column shows the estimate of this coeﬃcient for nominal annual
commercial paper returns between 1989 and 1994. Ex post real interest rate autocorrelation
is 0.52. This estimate is biased downward because of unanticipated inﬂation.
26Lag j (Years)
S t a t i s t i c 12357
(rS − rB)t ,(rS − rB)t+j
Data .03 -.21 .13 -.16 .13
Heterogeneous model -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02 -.02




(rS − rB)t ,(rS − rB)t−i

Data .03 -.18 -.05 -.28 -.15
Heterogeneous model -.02 -.04 -.06 -.08 -.10
Homogeneous model .01 .01 .02 .02 .03
(p − y)t,( rS − rB)t+j
Data -.18 -.27 -.08 -.21 -.05
Heterogeneous model -.07 -.06 -.06 -.06 -.06
Homogeneous model .02 .01 .02 .01 .01
(p − y)t, |rS − rB|t+j
Data -.20 -.06 -.06 -.18 -.12
Heterogeneous model -.14 -.13 -.11 -.11 -.11
Homogeneous model .15 .13 .13 .13 .13
Table 3: Autocorrelations and cross-correlations of simulated and historical data. All re-
turns are annual. For each statistic, we report a historical estimate and the corresponding
population moments of the heterogeneous and the homogeneous model, estimated based on




(years) Coeﬃcient R2 Coeﬃcient R2 Coeﬃcient R2
1 -.12 .04 -.03 .01 .01 .00
2 -.30 .10 -.05 .01 .01 .00
3 -.35 .11 -.07 .01 .02 .00
5 -.64 .23 -.09 .02 .02 .00
7 -.73 .25 -.11 .02 .03 .00
Table 4: Long horizon regressions. Log excess stock returns are regressed on the log price-
dividend ratio. The table reports the slope coeﬃcients of the regressions and the R2 for
historical data, the heterogeneous model and the homogeneous model. Historical estimates
are based on the 1889–1994 sample. Statistics for the model are estimated based on 50,000
years of simulated data.
28Figure 1: Utility weights. Utility weights f(γ) in the objective of the social planner are









































29Figure 2: Price-dividend ratio. The logarithm of the price-dividend ratio, p−y, is plotted as
a function of relative consumption. The solid line corresponds to the heterogeneous model,
the broken line corresponds to the homogeneous model.










































30Figure 3: Conditional moments of stock returns. Instantaneous Sharpe ratio and conditional
volatility of stock returns are plotted as functions of relative consumption. The solid line
corresponds to the heterogeneous model, the broken line corresponds to the homogeneous
model.
Panel A: Sharpe ratio Panel B: Volatility









































































































31Figure 4: Cross-sectional distribution of wealth. For every value of γ (horizontal axis), the
line shows the fraction of the aggregate wealth controlled by individuals with risk aversion
less than or equal to γ. The dotted, solid and broken lines correspond to three values of














































32Figure 5: Conditional volatility of returns in homogeneous economies. The conditional
volatility of stock returns is plotted as a function of relative consumption in three homoge-
neous economies. These economies diﬀer only with respect to the risk aversion parameter γ,
which takes values of 6, 8, and 10. All other model parameters are ﬁxed at their calibrated
values: ρ =5 .30% and λ =4 .02%.


























































33Figure 6: Risk-free rate and the risk premium. Risk-free rate r and the conditional risk
premium µR−r are plotted as functions of relative consumption. The solid line corresponds
to the heterogeneous model, the broken line corresponds to the homogeneous model.
Panel A: Risk-free rate Panel B: Risk premium
































































































34Figure 7: Individual risk exposure. Risk exposure is summarized by the instantaneous
market beta of the individual wealth process, βW,M. For every value of the individual market
beta (horizontal axis), the graph shows the fraction of the aggregate wealth controlled by
individuals with risk exposure less than or equal to βW,M. The dotted, solid and broken
lines correspond to three values of the aggregate state (relative consumption), ω − σ[ω], ω,
and ω + σ[ω] respectively.










































35Figure 8: Individual consumption volatility. For every value of the instantaneous volatility
of the individual consumption process (horizontal axis, measured as a fraction of the
volatility of the aggregate endowment σ), the graph shows the fraction of the aggregate
wealth controlled by individuals with consumption volatility less than or equal to that
value. The dotted, solid and broken lines correspond to three values of the aggregate state
(relative consumption), ω − σ[ω], ω,a n dω + σ[ω] respectively.
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